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– The purpose of this paper is to examine the generational differences among publicly traded 
family firms in regards to value creation and value appropriation in the innovation process by 
drawing upon the knowledge-based view (KBV) and family business literature with a focus on 
socioemotional wealth perspective. 
 
Design/methodology/approach 
– The authors tests the hypotheses via longitudinal regression analyses based on 285 yearly 
cross-firm S & P 500 firm observations. 
 
Findings 
– First, the authors found that family ownership with second or later generation’s majority 
exhibits lower levels of value creation capabilities compared to non-family firms, whereas there 
is no difference between those of the firms with family ownership with a first generation’s 
majority and non-family firms. Second, the authors also found that family owned firms with a 
first generation’s majority have higher value appropriation abilities compared to nonfamily 
firms, while there is no significant difference in value appropriation between the later generation 
family firms and non-family firms. 
 
Research limitations/implications 
– The study help scholars, family business members, and investors better understand family 




– The paper contributes to the family business, innovation, and KBV literature in several ways. 
While previous family business studies drawing upon resource-based view and KBV often focus 
on the value creation in family governance, the authors investigate both value creation and value 
appropriation phases of innovation process. 
 






Family firms are the dominant form of business organization around the world (La Porta et al., 
1999; Tagiuri and Davis, 1996; Zahra and Sharma, 2004). Many large publicly traded 
corporations are controlled by founding families (Villalonga and Amit, 2006, 2009). Family 
involvement occurs when a family exerts control over the firm through ownership and 
management (Chrisman et al., 2004). Accordingly, family controlled publicly traded firms are 
those in which the founders or family members are officers, directors, or block holders, either 
individually or as a group (Villalonga and Amit, 2009). When family involvement leads to the 
pursuit of particularistic goals and strategies (Carney, 2005), family firm behavior is expected to 
be distinct from those in non-family firms. Despite the inherent differences between family and 
nonfamily firms and among family firms themselves, family involvement is under researched in 
innovation studies, which limits the generalization of findings and leads to theoretical ambiguity 
(Chrisman et al., 2012; Dyer, 2003). 
 
Strategic decisions concerning the innovations may be the key in understanding differences 
between publicly traded family and non-family firms. Among all, technological innovation in 
family business has become an ascending research area (De Massis et al., 2012). Studies often 
highlight family firms’ limitations in innovativeness (e.g. Block, 2012), although family firms 
also vary in their willingness to invest in innovation activities as well as the capability to create 
value through innovations (De Massis et al., 2015). 
 
Nevertheless, current family business studies do not differentiate between value creation (i.e. 
developing new ways of doing things by using new methods, new technologies, and/or new 
forms of raw materials) (Lepak et al., 2007) and value appropriation (i.e. capturing value by the 
use of resources with attributes that make them difficult to imitate by competitors through the 
use of innovation and resource management) (Lepak et al., 2007; Sirmon et al., 2007) in the 
innovation process. The former denotes activities that create customer value by turning 
innovation input into innovation output, whereas the latter focusses on the extraction of profits 
from innovation (Alvarez and Barney, 2004; Arbussa and Coenders, 2007; Harabi, 
1995; Hurmelinna-Laukkanen and Puumalainen, 2007; Teece, 1986, 1996, 2000, 2006). 
 
 
Value creation alone is insufficient to achieve superior firm performance because performance is 
also contingent upon a firm’s ability to restrict competitive forces (e.g. erect barriers to 
knowledge spillover) so as to be able to appropriate value (Mizik and Jacobson, 2003; Lepak et 
al., 2007; Reitzig and Puranam, 2009). At both value creation and value appropriation stages of 
the innovation process, knowledge itself as a critical intangible resource (Felin and Hesterly, 
2007), and knowledge management are expected to play an important role. According 
to Sirmon et al. (2007), resource management is a complex process involving multiple activities 
such as structuring (i.e. acquiring, accumulating, and divesting), bundling (i.e. stabilizing, 
enriching, and pioneering), and leveraging (i.e. mobilizing, coordinating, and deploying) 
resources. Nevertheless, such a knowledge-based generational view has rarely been adopted in 
studying value creation in family business, and to our knowledge, there is no study exploring 
knowledge-based generational differences in value appropriation in innovation and to date, 
different generations’ knowledge management in family firms have not been explored. 
 
It should be noted that family business is a unique organizational context for studying value 
creation and value appropriation owing to the co-existence and trade-offs between economic and 
family centered non-economic goals (e.g. preservation of family values, harmony, social capital, 
and reputation, as well as the ability to behave altruistically toward family members) 
(Chrisman et al., 2012, 2014; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007). The particularistic pursuit and 
attainment of family centered non-economic goals (Carney, 2005) can lead to socioemotional 
wealth (SEW) (Berrone et al., 2012; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007). Gómez-Mejía et al. (2007) show 
that a desire to create and preserve SEW may result in family firms’ accepting or avoiding risk to 
their financial performance. The authors attribute this to family business owners’ being loss 
averse with respect to their SEW. Generally, this leads family firms to follow risk averse 
strategies in order to protect SEW but when firm performance is relatively lower than the 
aspirations, preference reversal may occur and family firms become risk-seeking (Berrone et al., 
2012; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010), such as in R & D investment (Chrisman and Patel, 2012). 
Accordingly, family firms are concerned with the trade-offs between economic and non-
economic goals that are necessary to maximize their overall utility (Chrisman et al., 2014). 
 
In this regard, more research is needed regarding the role generational differences play in family 
firms’ innovation for several reasons. First, the family business field has recognized that one 
fundamental difference between family and non-family firms is that family decision makers have 
the power and legitimacy to make decisions according to their personalized and particularized 
willingness (Carney, 2005), which makes the effects of knowledge attributes more salient. 
Second, a SEW perspective in the family business literature suggests that family firms differ 
from non-family firms in terms of their knowledge and knowledge management. Together with 
the first point, family business marks an organizational context that social interactions among its 
members not only create more valuable knowledge, but is also more likely to accumulate and 
retain created knowledge within the organization (Cummings and Teng, 2003; Lepak et al., 
2007). Third, the family business literature also notices that the nature of knowledge in family 
firms differs from non-family firms, as the former is characterized by more tacit and implicit 
knowledge (Cabrera-Suárez et al., 2001). In this regard, tacit and implicit knowledge has been 
highlighted as an important isolation mechanism in value appropriation that prevents the 
knowledge spillover and imitation by competitors (Reitzig and Puranam, 2009). Additionally, 
family firms are not only different from non-family firms, but also heterogeneous among 
themselves (Melin and Nordqvist, 2007). Family firms in various generations may have different 
knowledge management, including knowledge coordination as well as the nature of knowledge 
within firms (Gersick et al., 1997). Hence, there may be barriers for knowledge transfer from the 
founding generation to the later generation in family firms (Cabrera-Suárez et al., 2001); such 
that later generations may have more difficulty in obtaining, absorbing, and retaining knowledge 
which is crucial for innovations. In addition, due to the endowment of SEW, the founding 
generation often has more incentive for better knowledge management compared to later 
generations. Finally, the nature of knowledge in the founding generation is often implicit and 
tacit hence harder to be imitated, which can prevent or limit knowledge spillovers to competitors. 
However, the second generation is more likely to use formal approaches and routines and 
therefore utilize more explicit knowledge in strategic decisions and operations (Gersick et al., 
1997), which can result in more knowledge spillovers than that in the first generation. Overall, 
the family business setting provides a unique opportunity to study value creation and value 
appropriation from a knowledge-based SEW view within the context of generational differences. 
 
This study attempts to fill these gaps in the literature. First, by drawing upon the knowledge-
based generational view, we operationalize the registration number of patents of public-traded 
firms as a substantial innovation output, and explore the value creation process where R & D 
intensity (innovation input) is transformed into registered patents (innovation output). In 
addition, we also explore the value appropriation link between the number of patents (innovation 
output) and Tobin’s Q (firm performance) (Lawson et al., 2012). Differently from prior studies 
in the family business literature (e.g. Block et al., 2013), we consider first and second generation 
family ownership as a moderator in the R & D intensity-patent relationship and the patent-
performance relationship. Hence, we are not exploring whether family business innovates more 
or less (e.g. Block et al., 2013; De Massis et al., 2012). Instead, we suggest that family business 
is a unique organizational context that may have idiosyncratic effects on how firms transform 
innovation input into output and how innovation outputs may lead to firm performance. Second, 
we distinguish between dividing family ownership with the founding generation’s majority and 
family ownership with the second or later generation’s majority for the purpose of analyzing 
their distinctive moderation effects on the value-creation and value-appropriation processes in 
innovation in publicly traded family firms. Most importantly, our framework suggests that 
preservation of SEW is not only a goal that impacts strategic decisions, but also a source of 
resources which are non-imitable and non-substitutable compared to other organizational 
resources and capabilities. 
 
Longitudinal regression analyses based on 285 yearly cross-firm S & P 500 observations yield 
two insights. First, family ownership with the second or later generation’s majority demonstrates 
lower levels of value creation capabilities compared to non-family firms, whereas there is no 
difference between those firms with family ownership with the first generation’s majority and 
non-family firms. Second, family ownership with the first generation’s majority has higher value 
appropriation capabilities with higher profits from patenting compared to non-family firms. 
However, family firms with family ownership with a second or later generation’s majority are 
not different from non-family firms in terms of value appropriation. 
 
This study contributes to the family business, innovation management, and knowledge-based 
view (KBV) literatures in several ways. First, we emphasize both value creation and value 
appropriation in the innovation process in family firms which provides a better and more 
comprehensive understanding of the innovation processes in family firms. Second, we apply a 
SEW perspective in the KBV in family business. Indeed, SEW is the single most important 
feature of a family firm’s essence that separates it from non-family firms (Berrone et al., 2012) 
and requires research attention in innovation field and KBV. The SEW perspective suggests that 
certain emotional and social attributes among family members cannot only create knowledge, but 
also protect knowledge from spillovers or being imitated by competitors. Third, our findings 
suggest that a generational difference in family owned firms not only manifests itself in value 
creation, but also in value appropriation owing to their variant knowledge management abilities. 
Forth, we demonstrate the role of family ownership with generational differences (i.e. majority 
of first generation vs second or later generation) plays in family firm performance, as the results 
show that the family owned firms with a first generation’s majority are more successful than the 
family owned firms with a second or later generation’s majority in both value creation and value 
appropriation. Fifth, our findings also suggest that although, in general, family firms may be 
inferior in creating values in innovation, at least some family owned firms especially those with 
first generation’s majority have advantages in appropriating profits from innovation activities. 
These inform the innovation and KBV fields also by demonstrating the generational differences 
in intra-firm knowledge transfer and management in publicly traded family firms where 
strategies and actions tend to be idiosyncratically influenced by SEW concerns of the controlling 
families. 
 
In the remainder of this paper, we provide a theoretical overview, hypotheses, methodology, and 
results, followed by a discussion of the limitations and implications of our study for future 
research and practice. 
 
2. Theoretical Overview 
 
2.1 Value create and value appropriation  
 
Complementing Schumpeter’s (1934) study drawing attention to innovation as the source of 
value-creation, Teece (1986, 1996, 2000, 2006) emphasizes the importance of obtaining 
significant economic rents from the innovation, namely, the value appropriation. According 
to Teece (1986), value appropriation is a firm’s capability to capture profits after value creation. 
Thereby, superior performance can be achieved by not only creating value through innovation, 
but also protecting and leveraging the innovation by creating barriers to imitating or substituting 
behaviors in market competition (Alvarez, 2007; Alvarez and Barney, 2004, 2005; Dutta et al., 
2003; Lepak et al., 2007; Jacobides et al., 2006; Mizik and Jacobson, 2003; Teece, 2000). 
 
Within the framework of the resource-based view (RBV), a firm is a bundle of resources and 
capabilities (Penrose, 1959). Combining those resources and capabilities particularly knowledge-
based ones that are valuable, rare, not imitable, and not substitutable may lead to sustained 
competitive advantages (Amit and Zott, 2001; Barney, 1991; Baldwin and Henkel, 2012; Henkel 
and Baldwin, 2009; Wernerfelt, 1984). It should be noted that the RBV literature has explicitly 
differentiated value creation from value appropriation. For instance, Barney (1991, p. 
102) explains sustainable competitive advantage as the following: “a firm is said to have a 
sustained competitive advantage when it is implementing a value creation strategy […] and when 
those other firms are unable to duplicate the benefits of this strategy.” Here, Barney clearly 
draws a distinction between value creation (i.e. a firm’s capabilities to generate value based upon 
the development and accumulation of competitive resources) and value appropriation, denoting 
to a firm’s capability to prevent competitors’ imitating and substituting behaviors so that created 
value can lead to firm performance (Dierickx and Cool, 1989). 
 
In this paper, we conceptualize value creation as part of the innovation process where innovation 
input is transformed into innovation output, and value appropriation as the process in which 
innovation output turns into firm performance (Alvarez and Barney, 2004). Accordingly, value 
creation and value appropriation are theorized as firm’s efficiencies of transformations in these 
two processes. Empirically, any organizational feature that improves the transformation should 
positively moderate the link in either process as the originally positive connection becomes 
stronger, whereas any obstacle that mitigates the capability should negatively moderate the link 
such that the connection becomes weaker. 
 
The literature has narrated that there are distinctive market, organizational, and individual 
sources that may contribute to value creation and value appropriation (Lepak et al., 2007). In 
terms of value creation, the literature has highlighted the role of market competition 
(Schumpeter, 1934), government policy (Porter, 1990), technological and market innovation 
(Porter, 1985), external social network (Smith et al., 2005), internal social connections (Nahapiet 
and Ghoshal, 1998) as well as the creativity of managers and entrepreneurs in firms (Brown and 
Eisenhardt, 1998). Concerning value appropriation, the literature has highlighted firm-level 
isolation mechanisms, such as patents and reputation (Jacobides et al. 2006; Reitzig and 
Puranam, 2009), which can prevent the direct imitation by competitors. Research also highlights 
the importance of tacit knowledge as well as social complexity and causal ambiguity, which in 
combination prevents the knowledge spillover to competitors (Felin and Hesterly, 2007; Lepak et 
al., 2007). 
 
2.2. Value creation and value appropriation in KBV 
 
An important extension of RBV is the KBV, which considers knowledge as the most 
strategically significant resource within a firm (Kogut and Zander, 1992). According to Leonard 
and Sensiper (1998), organizational knowledge is more than the sum of individual members’ 
knowledge; rather it is an organizational phenomenon that stems from the exchange and 
integration of many individuals’ knowledge (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). Since organizational 
knowledge aggregates and enriches individual members’ knowledge, it can increase a firm’s 
capacity for innovation and strategic differentiation (Subramanian and Youndt, 2005), which 
eventually leads to value creation and value capture in organizational settings (Lepak et al., 
2007). 
It should be noted that the extant KBV literature has already recognized the salient role of 
knowledge in both value creation and value appropriation. On one hand, the literature highlights 
that firms vary in their sharing, coordinating, and integrating knowledge among its members 
(Lepak et al., 2007). In this regard, firm tasks, routines, and divisions are heterogeneous in terms 
of their knowledge management (e.g. the creation of new knowledge, the acquisition of existing 
knowledge, and the storage of old knowledge), and creating value requires firms to develop 
abilities to coordinate and integrate knowledge in variant areas (Amit and Zott, 2001; Eisenhardt 
and Martin, 2000; Sirmon et al., 2007; Teece et al., 1997). Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) further 
suggest that the social connections of individuals within the firm will provide greater information 
and knowledge that can be used to create new organizational knowledge, which is positively 
related to value creation (Smith et al., 2005). In this regard, organizations that can effectively 
integrate and coordinate knowledge among organizational members can be superior in 
knowledge coordination and integration. 
 
On the other hand, the literature also highlights the nature of knowledge as well as the mobility 
of key individuals in the organizations as important antecedents of value appropriation. This line 
of research suggests that value appropriation can be developed via creating and accumulating 
tacit knowledge (Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Lippman and Rumelt, 1982) and/or building 
mechanisms to reduce the mobility of the knowledge (Campbell et al., 2012; Rumelt, 1984). 
Here, tacit knowledge is differentiated from explicit knowledge as the former is less codifiable 
and formalized (Polanyi, 1962; Alvarez and Barney, 2004). Tacit knowledge is often 
idiosyncratic to the organization and requires social interaction for transmission (Szulanski, 
1996), thereby making competitor’s imitation difficult (Kogut and Zander, 1992; Zander and 
Kogut, 1995). In addition, an isolating mechanism refers to the imposed constraint on knowledge 
diffusion such as policies that limit the mobility of key decision makers and experts in the firm 
(Campbell et al., 2012; Rumelt, 1984). Given the existence of tacit knowledge and the isolating 
mechanism(s), firm knowledge is less likely to spill into competitors, hence more likely to be 
appropriated into firm profits (Alvarez and Barney, 2004). 
 
It should be noted that effective intra-firm knowledge transfer is also a factor which can impact 
value creation and value appropriation. Knowledge transfer is important to value creation and 
appropriation. This is because socially formed and accumulated knowledge is not perfectly 
transferable, and tacit knowledge is more likely to develop through learning-by-doing 
schema. Szulanksi (1996) further suggests that the characteristics of knowledge (i.e. causal 
ambiguity and unprovenness), source (i.e. lack of motivation and reliability), recipient (i.e. lack 
of motivation, absorptive capacity, and retentive capacity), and context (i.e. barren context with 
formalized structure and systems and arduous relationships with limited communication, 
exchanges, and interactions) can prevent or restrict knowledge transfer in organizations. The 
author also shows that the recipient’s lack of absorptive capacity, causal ambiguity, and an 
arduous relationship between source and recipient are the most important barriers for knowledge 
transfer. 
 
In sum, while the RBV literature clearly draws a distinction between value creation and value 
appropriation, KBV scholars extend this line of research by arguing that the abilities of value 
creation and value appropriation stem from the distinctive characteristics of knowledge and 
attributes of the organization. Overall, the proponents argue that a firm’s knowledge, partially 
impacted by the organization, can determine a firm’s abilities in creating and appropriating 
values from economic activities (Conner and Prahalad, 1996). As we will further argue in the 
following sections, we suggest that a comprehensive understanding of innovation in family firms 
must consider the family firm-specific phenomena, particularly SEW, which not only 
distinguishes family firms from non-family firms, but also creates generational differences 
among family firms. Indeed, SEW concerns in family firms are likely to affect knowledge 
transfer and management in different generations. 
 
2.3. KBV and SEW in family firms 
 
This section addresses the question of what role SEW plays in knowledge creation, transfer, and 
management in family firms, which can shape value creation and value appropriation. RBV 
theorists argue that family firms differ from non-family firms as well as other family firms by the 
levels and types of the involvement they exert on firm capabilities (Habberson et al., 2003). This 
is because capabilities in family firms result from the idiosyncratic interactions between the 
family, its individual members, and the business (Sirmon and Hitt, 2003). One important way 
that family firms build competitive capabilities is through family centered family firm-specific 
knowledge (Cabrera-Suárez et al., 2001). It has been argued that the long-term intertwining 
between family and business systems helps to create and accumulate family centered family 
firm-specific knowledge (Gedajlovic and Carney, 2010; Zahra et al., 2007). In this paper, built 
upon prevailing SEW view, we further argue that value creation and value appropriation of 
knowledge in family firms are also driven by the presence of family centered SEW. 
 
At the margin, family owners are expected to attach greater weight to family centered SEW 
(Chrisman et al., 2012) than economic goals (e.g. Zellweger and Astrachan, 2008) because the 
achievement of the former creates SEW for the family whereas the loss of SEW can result in 
diminished intimacy, lowered status, and inability to meet family expectations (Berrone et al., 
2012; Gómez-Mejíaet al., 2007, 2010). The literature has recognized that the intention to 
preserve SEW tends to cause unique firm behaviors, such as the tendency to avoid R & D 
investment (Chrisman and Patel, 2012; Block, 2012) and international diversification (Gomez-
Mejia et al., 2010). Paradoxically, family firms increase their R & D investments when their 
firm’s survival, and therefore all their SEW, is at risk (Chrisman and Patel, 2012). 
 
Nevertheless, SEW is also a unique firm attribute that may impact the value creation and value 
appropriation in firms. This is mainly due to the fact that SEW involving binding social ties can 
foster interactions among both family and non-family members, which in turn nurtures value 
creation through generating family firm-specific tacit knowledge and prevents knowledge 
spillovers, which are crucial for value appropriation (Berrone et al., 2012). In this regard, SEW 
(Berrone et al., 2012) involving family control and influence, binding social ties, emotional 
attachment, family members’ identification with the firm, and renewal of family bonds to the 
firm through dynastic succession are relevant to the generational KBV of family firms we are 
suggesting. 
 
Family control and influence are integral in family’s ability to exercise authority and pursue 
family centered goals within the firm. Emotional attachment refers to the role of emotions in 
building and maintaining binding family as well as social ties. Emotional attachment and 
connections among family members may help overcome information asymmetries of 
idiosyncratic knowledge through close contacts (Lee et al., 2003), hence make the coordination 
and integration of variant knowledge relatively easier under family governance. In addition, 
emotional attachment can help strengthen family members’ commitment to the business; hence 
family members are less likely to leave the organization, further preventing the mobility of the 
knowledge. Similarly, family identification refers to the close identification of family members 
with the firm. In organizations where families identify with their firms, there is a longer history 
of knowledge creation in terms of shared experiences and past events that converge to influence 
and shape current activities, events, and relationships. This suggests that knowledge development 
in family firms are largely family firm-specific and tacit in nature, and not likely to be replicated 
and used in other organizations, and hence knowledge spillovers from family to non-family firms 
become less likely, while the intra-firm knowledge transfer can be easier within the same 
generation. Although in general, family firms may have advantages in coordinating knowledge 
as well as preventing the mobility of knowledge, scholars also argue that trans-generational 
succession in family governance may bring in difficulties; hence knowledge in family firms may 
be heterogeneous among different generations (Chirico and Salvato, 2008). As will be further 
discussed in the following section, we suggest that there is a generational difference regarding 
the nature and structure of knowledge as well as the propensity to manage knowledge through 
coordinating, integrating, and transferring within the firm and preventing knowledge spillovers. 
Hence, family firms’ capabilities in value creation as well as value appropriation are expected to 
differ among family firms from different generations and from non-family firms. 
 
3. Hypothesis development 
 
According to the KBV as aforementioned, a firm’s capability of value creation is primarily 
determined by firm’s capabilities to manage (i.e. coordinate and integrate) knowledge in variant 
areas. Nevertheless, a firm’s capability of value appropriation is mainly determined by the nature 
of the knowledge and the strength of isolating mechanisms. In this section, based on the SEW 
perspective, we further develop hypotheses by arguing that founding and later generations of 
family firms differ from not only non-family firms, but also each other in terms of both value 
creation and value appropriation. 
 
3.1. Value creation in publicly traded family firms 
 
The founders of family firms have been identified by their critical role in the continuity and 
sustainability of the business (Salvato et al., 2010; Zellweger et al., 2011). The literature 
recognizes that family leaders significantly affect strategic decisions of the firm as they have the 
power, authority, and legitimacy to do so (Carney, 2003; Chrisman et al., 2012; Zahra, 2003). 
The literature also highlights that when business governance is led by the founding generation, 
the effectiveness of implementation increases while its cost decreases, meaning more values are 
created (Habberson and Williams, 1999). 
 
One of the reasons for value creation process, where innovation inputs (i.e. R & D intensity) are 
turned into outputs (i.e. patents), to be potentially more successful in family firms with the 
founding generation’s majority than that in non-family firms is that founding-generation family 
firms are better in coordinating and integrating knowledge from different tasks, routines, 
divisions, or departments in the firm compared to non-family firms. One critical condition of 
knowledge coordination and integration is the extent that the members of the organization 
communicate without triggering relational conflict (Eddleston and Kellermanns, 2007; Steier, 
2001). In this regard, the founding generation exhibit advantages over non-family firms through 
components of SEW, such as close monitoring and control by the family, binding ties, emotional 
attachment, and identification with the firm for several reasons. First, the family can enjoy 
exercising authority through family control and influence over the business. Effective monitoring 
and control by the family can enhance the focus on tasks and self-serving behaviors can be 
restricted by family control. Second, shared experiences through working together in the 
entrepreneurial and adolescence stages of the firm helps build high levels of cohesiveness and 
emotional attachment among family members (Gersick et al., 1997). 
 
Furthermore, in a newly founded family business, family business members tend to share the 
common goal of keeping the family together in the business, and accordingly the business is 
perceived as an extension of the family (Berrone et al., 2012; Steier and Miller, 2010) through 
identification with the firm. This often motivates family members to place a higher priority on 
the common goals rather than their self-serving interests (Corbetta and Salvato, 2004), unlike in 
non-family firms, and accordingly mitigates the relational conflict among family members 
(Eddleston and Kellermanns, 2007) and enhances the focus on communicating, sharing, and 
integrating knowledge, further enhancing value creation process. Moreover, future generations in 
mind, the founding generation is motivated and obligated to ensure value creation by effectively 
turning firm inputs into fruitful outcomes in order to pass a successful business onto offspring. 
This long-term orientation beyond the founder’s career and life time is unique to family firms. 
 
In sum, compared to managers in non-family firms, the founding generation driven by SEW 
concerns has the incentive to effectively coordinate and integrate knowledge from variant areas 
in the organization to enhance success in value creation process. Hence: 
H1. First generation’s majority in ownership moderates the link between innovation input (R & 
D intensity) and output (patents), such that the positive relationship becomes stronger in family 
firms with first generation’s majority compared to non-family firms. 
 
Nevertheless, the above advantages contributing to the preservation of SEW as well as the 
coordination and integration of knowledge in family firms, tend to diminish in later generations. 
This is because family influence diminishes in later generations (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007). 
When family influence and control are reduced through dispersed ownership, the preservation of 
SEW becomes less of a concern in later generations (Berrone et al., 2012). Accordingly, lower 
levels of SEW concerns may harm the value creation process by reducing coordination and 
integration of knowledge. Additionally, relational conflict is more likely to arise in second or 
later generations, further weakening emotional attachment, identification with the firm, family 
bonds, and social ties. These can interfere with the coordination and integration of knowledge. 
Indeed, the founding-generation’s legitimate power can help direct the focus toward firm 
performance, whereas descendants may be preoccupied with engaging in power contests 
individually or through forming family coalitions, shifting the focus from value creation to 
politics, which can foster relational conflict (Eddleston and Kellermanns, 2007; Kellermanns and 
Eddleston, 2004) and harm the value creation process. 
 
Even when the family exhibits harmony, the transition from founding family control to the 
descendant family control leads to dispersed family ownership and reduced concerns for SEW. 
This may result in the pursuit of self-centered individual interests rather than the common goals 
and collectivistic behaviors among family members (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007), which can 
further influence the value creation process negatively through retarding firm-wide coordination 
and integration of knowledge. 
 
In addition, intra-firm knowledge transfer from first generation to later generation can be 
hindered when the later generation is not compatible with the first generation in terms of the 
level of motivation, knowledge, experiences, and skills (Szulanski, 1996). For example, the later 
generation may be content with the inherited wealth and lack the motivation to learn new 
knowledge. If the later generation also holds poor absorptive and retentive capacities, this can 
limit knowledge transfer from first generation to later generation. Furthermore, formal structures 
and systems established over time owing to growth and larger firm size, can restrict the 
knowledge transfer from one generation to the other. Additionally, in case of relational conflict, 
arduous relationships prevent effective knowledge transfer from first generation to the later 
generations. 
 
As a result, we expect that the advantages of knowledge coordination and integration start to 
decrease in the second or later generation family firms and intra-firm knowledge transfer from 
first generation to later generation becomes harder with the rise of relational conflict and 
diminished concerns for the preservation of SEW. This can interfere with value creation-the 
transformation from innovation input to innovation output in the second or later generation 
compared to non-family firms. As such: 
 
H2. Second or later generation’s majority in ownership negatively moderates the link between 
innovation input (R & D intensity) and output (patents), such that the positive relationship 
becomes weaker in family firms with second generation’s majority compared to non-family 
firms. 
 
3.2. Value appropriation in publicly traded family firms 
 
As we discussed earlier, value creation is not sufficient for superior performance (Mizik and 
Jacobson, 2003). A firm can appropriate profits on innovations only when it can restrict 
competition by creating barriers to imitation. The key to value appropriation is either to create 
and accumulate tacit knowledge so that competitors cannot imitate or to restrict the mobility of 
organizational employees so that the key experts are less likely to be recruited by competitors 
(Alvarez and Barney, 2004; Arbussa and Coenders, 2007; Harabi, 1995; Hurmelinna-Laukkanen 
and Puumalainen, 2007). 
 
The components of SEW are expected to play an important role in the value appropriation 
process as that in value creation. This is because family control over the business, intentions for 
intra-family succession that serve the renewal of family bonds, strong identification with the 
family business, and binding family ties can help build tacit and family business-specific 
knowledge and emotional attachment can help prevent the mobility of family business members 
and knowledge spillovers to competitors. In this regard, we expect that the founding generation 
can enhance value appropriation process in family firms unlike that in non-family firms for two 
reasons. 
 
First, the nature of knowledge in newly founded firms is more tacit and less formalized, hence 
less likely to be imitated by competitors compared to that in non-family firms. The knowledge 
management literature differentiates between explicit and tacit knowledge as the former is less 
context-dependent and more likely to be transferred via systematized language or code (Polanyi, 
1966). In contrast, tacit knowledge can hardly be expressed or formalized because it appears and 
develops through the interaction between an individual and the situation, becoming context and 
time specific (Kogut and Zander, 1992; Zander and Kogut, 1995). 
 
In addition, the founding generation family members often work together as a team in order to 
discover and exploit entrepreneurial opportunities (Shane, 2000). Hence, founders often 
accumulate knowledge via previous collaborative working experiences. Nevertheless, this 
knowledge is relatively hard to be directly learned because the accumulation is contingent upon 
the specific collaborative working and/or timing conditions, which is deeply impacted by the 
socioemotional concerns such as bonding ties with customers or emotional attachment with other 
founders. Differently put, knowledge created by the founding generation is largely socially based 
and hence tacit in nature, meaning direct imitation from competitors becomes less likely. 
 
Second, the founding generation in a family business also has the advantage in developing 
isolating mechanisms by reducing the mobility of experts and employees, unlike in non-family 
firms. In family firms, greater employee care, and loyalty (Donckels and Frohlich, 
1991; Habberson and Williams, 1999; Ward, 1988) provided by family firm founders can 
uniquely limit the mobility of employees and consequent knowledge spillovers to competitors. 
According to Miller and Le Breton-Miller (2005, p. 521), since controlling “families so cherish 
the firm, they also treasure those who staff it and sustain it.” Hence, particularly family business 
founders with higher levels of influence, control, commitment, and attachment to the firm than 
second or later generations generally treat their employees well. In return, employees stay loyal 
to the firm, facilitating preservation of tacit knowledge associated with the innovations within the 
family firm. These are all expected to enhance the success of the value appropriation process in 
family firms compared to that non-family firms: 
 
H3. First generation’s majority in ownership positively moderates the link between innovation 
output (patents) and firm performance (Tobin’s Q), such that the positive relationship becomes 
stronger in family firms with first generation’s majority compared to non-family firms. 
 
However, owing to the diminished family influence in second and later generations (Schulze et 
al., 2003; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007), the family firms with second or later generation’s majority 
are likely to use formal procedures and routines developed and established over time owing to 
growth and larger firm size, which can reduce their advantages in value appropriation, as in 
value creation. We expect this to happen for several reasons. 
 
First, although the family business literature has recognized that family firms may have 
competitive advantages over non-family businesses owing to the tacit knowledge stemming from 
the shared history and daily interactions among family, and business and family members 
(Habberson and Williams, 1999), “(tacit) information about the familiness bundle is frequently 
embedded in certain individuals, generally the entrepreneur/family business founder” (Cabrera-
Suárez et al., 2001, p. 39). One of the reasons is that the tacit knowledge, as created and 
accumulated by the first generation, is hard to be transferred to later generations, owing to causal 
ambiguity, recipient generation’s lower levels of motivation, absorptive and retentive capacity by 
relying upon the inherited wealth, and less intimacy among dispersed owners. Tacit knowledge is 
closely related to unique work experiences (Polanyi, 1966) and therefore less likely to be 
diffused given the situation that the successor often has been brought up “within” and lived with 
the business. The explicit and codifiable knowledge and routines utilized by the second or later 
generation can be learned by the competitors easily and the innovations can be substantially 
imitated, restricting the value appropriation. Additionally, expanded networks developed over 
time can result in more knowledge spillovers than in the past. 
 
Second, although given passive roles in the transfer of tacit knowledge, late-generation family 
members are not always passive recipients of knowledge in the family business (Cabrera-
Suárez et al., 2001; Lee et al., 2003; Steier, 2001). Later generation family members often get 
professional business education in order to become qualified as family business successors and 
are expected to utilize professional norms and routines (Chung and Yuen, 2003; Santiago, 2000). 
In this regard, later generation family members may introduce explicit routines and norms into 
organizational knowledge of family firms, which may not be consistent with earlier tacit 
knowledge such as family values and traditions (Chua et al., 2009; Gedajlovic et al., 2004). For 
example, research shows that successors can take positive parts in the process of 
professionalization, in which family firms abandon certain traditions inconsistent with 
professional and social norms (Parada et al., 2010). This can limit knowledge transfer from first 
generation to later generation. 
 
Aside from less tacit knowledge, second or later generation family businesses have 
disadvantages in restricting mobility of non-family managers and employees. For instance, non-
family managers and employees may perceive exclusive treatment of second or later generation 
family members who may lack necessary qualifications (Chrisman et al., 2014). Indeed, as an 
important component of SEW, the first generation’s desire to renew family bonds through 
dynastic succession tends to result in exclusive employment and treatment of family members 
(Barnett and Kellermanns, 2006; Berrone et al., 2012). These may lower the loyalty among non-
family employees toward the firm and increase their perceptions of injustice and propensity to 
leave (Barnett and Kellermanns, 2006;Memili and Barnett, 2008), resulting in knowledge 
spillovers to competitors from the family firm. This increases imitability of innovations, resulting 
in the innovator family firm’s having to share the profits with the follower/imitator competitors. 
Second or later generation family business members themselves also may seek career 
opportunities in other firms owing to less identification with the firm, weaker family ties, 
emotional attachment, and commitment to the family firm. These can result in even more 
knowledge spillover to competitors, limiting profits on innovations in publicly traded family 
firms with second or a later generation’s majority: 
 
H4. Second generation’s majority in ownership negatively moderates the link between 
innovation output (patents) and firm performance (Tobin’s Q), such that the positive relationship 
becomes weaker in family firms with later generation’s majority compared to non-family firms. 
 
In the following Methodology section, we examine the moderation effects of different 
generations’ majority in ownership on value creation (innovation input (R & D 
intensity)→innovation output (patent)) and value appropriation (innovation output 





Figure 1 Theoretical model 
 




Consistent with previous studies investigating publicly traded family firms, the sample came 
from the S & P 500 (e.g. Anderson and Reeb, 2003a, b, 2004; Short et al., 2009; Combs et al., 
2010). The S & P 500 stock market index is maintained by Standard & Poor’s and involves 500 
large-cap US firms covering about 75 percent of the US equity market. This sample is selected 
for a number of reasons. First, this sample includes both family and nonfamily firms. Anderson 
and Reeb (2003a) suggest that families are present in one-third of the S & P 500. Second, family 
firms among the population are likely to have substantial number of nonfamily shareholders 
unlike privately held firms. Hence, this sample is representative of the publicly traded family and 
nonfamily firm population. Finally this sample has been used in studying innovation in family 
business in terms of R & D investment and patents (Block et al., 2013). To conclude, we believe 
this sample is appropriate for the purpose of this study. 
 
We design our study based on observations of the S & P 500 firms from 2002 to 2006. The 
primary data sources are Thompson Reuters Thompson One and US Patent and Trademark 
Office (USPTO) patent full-text and image database. Accounting, market, ownership, and 
management data are largely obtained from Thompson Reuters Thompson One Corporate 
Development database. Family business members, including their generations and their 
involvement in management, are identified by using the Hoover’s database and annual reports in 
Mergent Online. Patent data were collected from USPTO database which records the annual 
patent applications in the office. Instrumental variables concerning governance provision are 
obtained from a larger project designed to investigate all the companies incorporated in the USA 
in the Investor Responsibility Research Center books investigated in terms of their usage of 24 
control enhancing governance mechanisms (Gompers et al., 2003). Due to the fact that there are 
two years lag in two models, and provision database has a number of missing data, our sample is 
largely limited. Overall, we have 285 firm-year observations for further analysis. 
 
We control for one year lag between dependent variables and others to recognize the fact that 
both value creation (innovation input to innovation output) and value appropriation (innovation 
output to firm performance) occurs over time. In addition, to acknowledge the fact that fact that 





Family ownership: two types of family ownership-founding family ownership and second or 
later generation family ownership-are measured as the percentage of ownership that the either 
the founding generation or later generation exhibits. It should be noted that founder ownership is 
theoretically distinctive from first-generation family ownership (Gedajlovic et al., 2004). In 
addition, founder owned and family owned enterprises – including both first-generation and 
second-generation – tend to perform differently (Miller et al., 2007). Indeed, the effect of 
founder ownership on innovation has been recognized in the family business literature (Block, 
2012;Block et al., 2013), while the generational difference has been often ignored. We follow 
Miller and colleagues in classifying family business as those with no less than 5 percent family 
ownership and at least one family member in Top Management Team (TMT). Accordingly, the 
first generation family ownership is measured as the percentage of family ownership in family 
business when only the first generation is involved in its TMT, whereas the second generation 
family ownership is measured as the percentage of family ownership in family business when 
there is second or later generation involved in family business TMT (Miller et al., 2007). This 
measurement reflects the fact that the extent that family ownership may impact firm decision 
making is largely through family’s involvement in business. 
 
Innovation input (R & D intensity) and output (patent): we operationalize innovation input as 
innovation intensity as a percentage. (i.e. R & D expenditure divided by total sales) (Block et al., 
2013; Miller et al., 2007). Patents are measured as the absolute number of patents the focal firm 
has registered in USPTO. It should be noted that we intend to use patent as the DV in regressing 
value creation and IV in regressing value appropriation, because patents have been largely used 
in the innovation literature as one important innovation output. In addition, publicly traded firms 
in the USA do not typically report other innovation outputs, like the situation of smaller sized 
counterparts. Furthermore, patents by themselves have been studied as an isolation mechanism 
that can prevent knowledge mobility and facilitate knowledge appropriation (Reitzig and 
Puranam, 2009). This indicates that our study does not focus on the isolating effect of patents per 
se (which is likely to be captured by the single variable of the patent), but rather we try to capture 
the additional value appropriation effects captured by the interactions between family ownership 
in different generations and patents. 
 
 
Different from prior studies in family business (e.g. Block et al., 2013), we intend to use patent 
rather than patent citation as a measure of innovation output for two reasons. First, patent citation 
is impacted by competitors and other forces in the market, while the application and registration 
of patents are largely initiated and completed by the focal firms. Hence, as this paper intends to 
build a firm level theory, we choose to use variable that is consistent with this focus. In addition, 
part of the argument in this paper is to conceptualize patent as an isolation mechanism, which 
may limit the competitive behaviors from other market parties. Patent citation may reflect the 
importance of innovation output (e.g. Block et al., 2013), but does not necessarily relate to the 
isolation effect that patent can create. 
 
Firm Performance: firm performance is measured via Tobin’s Q (Chung and Pruitt, 1994) with 
accounting data provided by Thomson Reuters. The use of this firm performance measurement in 
this study followed Anderson and Reeb (2004), Villalonga and Amit (2006a, b, 2009), 
and Miller et al. (2007). Tobin’s Q is a market based measure of firm performance incorporating 
current operations, potential growth opportunities, and future operating performance (Anderson 
and Reeb, 2004). Hence, it reflects both current and anticipated profitability. Additionally, this 
market-based measure of firm performance is reflective of shareholder wealth creation, which 
suits the main concerns of this paper. Tobin’s Q is the ratio of the firm’s market value to the 
replacement value of its assets (Villalonga and Amit, 2006a; Miller et al., 2007; Richard et al., 
2009). The formula for Tobin’s Q (Miller et al., 2007) is as follows: ((common shares 
outstanding×calendar year closing price)+(current liabilities-current assets)+(long-term 
debt)+(liquidating value of preferred stock)/total assets). 
 
Controls: we add a number of control variables in the analysis. We control for family 
management by the percentage of family members in TMT and the absolute number of family 
managers in TMT divided by log of annual sales. The second variable intends to control for 
family’s management over firm’s daily operation. We control for non-family insider ownership 
measured as a percentage, institutional ownership measured as a percentage of overall 
institutional ownership of voting shares outstanding (Anderson and Reeb, 2004). To account for 
the fact that firms are heterogeneous, we control for firm size (i.e. log of the number of 
employees) (Dewar and Dutton, 1986), firm age (i.e. the number of years the firm has been in 
existence since founding), firm risk (the standard deviation of stock returns for the previous 60 
months) (Anderson and Reeb, 2003a, 2004) and prior firm performance (Tobin’s Q in prior 
year). Following prior studies (e.g. Block et al., 2013), we also control for firm leverage and firm 
liquidity. Firm leverage is measured using debt-to-equity ratio, measured as a percentage. Firm 
liquidity is measured as the current ratio, i.e. current assets divided by current liabilities 
calculated by percentage. The current ratio is an indication of a firm’s market liquidity and 
ability to meet creditor’s demands. We control for internationalization (i.e. percentage of sales 
from foreign domain) and primary firm industries (i.e. retail, service, manufacturing and other 
sectors, measured by using three dummies of retail, service and manufacturing industries). We 
also adjust dependent variables (innovation output and firm performance) in regression models 
by industrial average in SIC 2-digits as another control of industrial effects. 
 
Table I summarizes the descriptive statistics regarding the difference between first generation 
majority family business, second generation majority family business, and nonfamily 
business. Table II reports descriptives and correlations. First generation family ownership 
majority does not appear to outperform nonfamily firms (−0.03, p > 0.05), while second 
generation family ownership majority is negatively and significantly correlated to firm 
performance (−0.11, p < 0.05). Innovation is found positively and significantly to be correlated 
to firm performance (0.24, p < 0.01). Non-family insider ownership is found to be positively and 
significantly correlated to firm performance (0.11, p < 0.05). Both firm age (−0.12, p < 0.05) and 
firm size (−0.30, p < 0.01) are found negatively correlated with firm performance. Regarding R 
& D investment and patents, first and second family ownership majority does not appear to be 
significantly different from non-family firms. In addition, both first (0.28, p < 0.01) and second 
family ownership majority (0.30, p < 0.01) are positively and significantly correlated to family 
management. We also calculate the variance inflation factors (VIF) to examine whether the 
results were subject to the threat of multicollinearity. VIF values were all lower than 5, 













Due to the longitudinal data structure, OLS regression may generate biased estimates. Fixed 
effects panel regression can control for unobservable cross-sectional characteristics (Frye, 2004), 
and it has been applied in previous family business studies (Chen and Hsu, 2009). At the five 
percent level of significance, The Hausman test suggests that fixed effects GLS panel model is 
more appropriate than random effects for both value creation models (Model 1 and 2) and value 
appropriation models (Model 3 and 4). Hence, we used fixed effect longitudinal regression 
analysis to test all hypotheses. We also used the Huber-White sandwich estimator (clustered at 




To control for the possible endogeneity of family ownership due to unobservable organizational 
or environmental characteristics that are not captured in the control variables, we implement 
the Heckman’s (1979) two-stage technique (see Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007). Using Heckman’s 
two-stage procedure, we first estimate two probit models for each period. In the first model, first 
family generation majority (=1) vs non-family firm (=0) is the endogenous variable, and estimate 
the inverse Mills ratio. In the second model, second generation majority (=1) vs non-family firm 
(=0) is the endogenous variable, and estimate the inverse Mills ratio. We then estimate the 
regression of value creation and value appropriation using two inverse Mills ratios from the two 
probit models as additional controls. It should be noted that this approach can also control for 
self-selection of independent variables. In this regard, the possible selecting effect of controls 
(firm age, firm size, etc.) on family ownership variables will be blocked from the analyses. 
 
In the first-stage model, we use five instrumental variables that may affect the likelihood of 
family control, but are not correlated to firm innovation, patent or firm performance. All five 
instrumental variables relate to governance provisions. Data regarding governance provisions 
usage was obtained from a larger project designed to investigate all the companies incorporated 
in the USA in the Investor Responsibility Research Center books (Gompers et al., 2003). The 
provisions we chose are related to status, voting rights, legal protection, monetary protection, and 
protection of positions. All the provisions are measured by five-point Likert scales in which 1 
represents the weakest and 5 means the strongest. It should be noted that family owners are 
inclined to set up governance provisions that best represent their interests. Nevertheless, there is 
no theoretical basis to link governance provisions directly with either firm innovation 




As mentioned above, we intend to control for one year lag between dependent variable and all 
others to test each hypothesis. In addition, to account for the temporal distance between the stage 
of value creation and the stage of value appropriation, we control for one-year lag between these 
two stages. Put differently, the dependent variable and others are controlled in t−1 and t−2 terms 
in the model of value creation, while the dependent variable and others are controlled in t and t−1 
terms in the model of value appropriation. To control for the nature of endogenous development 
of innovation in organizations, we add patent and R & D intensity in t−2 term in testing for value 
appropriation. Our hypotheses also suggest that patent mediates the causal relationship between 
R & D intensity and firm performance. Given this fact, we also test for the mediation effect. 




Model 1: Patentt−1 (adjusted by SIC2 industrial average)=Constant+R & D Intensityt−2+1st 
Generation Majorityt−2+2nd Generation Majorityt−2+Family Management Percentaget−2+Family 
Management adjusted by Firm Sizet−2+Nonfamily Insider Ownershipt−2+Institutional 
Ownershipt−2+Firm Sizet−2+Firm Aget−2+Firm Riskt−2+Prior Firm Performancet−2+Current 
Ratiot−2+Debt-to-Equity 
Ratiot−2+Internationalizationt−2+Retailt−2+Servicet−2+Manufacturingt−2+Inverse Mill Ratio (first 
family generation)+Inverse Mill Ratio (second family generation) 
 
Model 2: Patentt−1 (adjusted by SIC2 industrial average)=Constant+R & D Intensityt−2+1st 
Generation Majorityt−2+2nd Generation Majorityt−2+1st Generation Majorityt−2 × R & D 
Intensityt−2+2nd Generation Majorityt−2 × R & D Intensityt−2+Family Management 
Percentaget−2+Family Management adjusted by Firm Sizet−2+Nonfamily Insider 
Ownershipt−2+Institutional Ownershipt−2+Firm Sizet−2+Firm Aget−2+Firm Riskt−2+Prior Firm 
Performancet−2+Current Ratiot−2+Debt-to-Equity 
Ratiot−2+Internationalizationt−2+Retailt−2+Servicet−2+Manufacturingt−2+Inverse Mill Ratio (first 




Model 3: Tobin’s Qt (adjusted by SIC2 industrial average)=Constant+Patentt−1+R & D 
Intensityt−2+1st Generation Majorityt−1+2nd Generation Majorityt−1+R & D 
Intensityt−1+Patentt−2+Family Management Percentaget−1+Family Management adjusted by Firm 
Sizet−1+Nonfamily Insider Ownershipt−1+Institutional Ownershipt−1+Firm Sizet−1+Firm 
Aget−1+Firm Riskt−1+Prior Firm Performancet−1+Current Ratiot−1+Debt-to-Equity 
Ratiot−1+Internationalizationt−1+Retailt−1+Servicet−1+Manufacturingt−1+Inverse Mill Ratio (first 
family generation)+Inverse Mill Ratio (second family generation) 
 
Model 4: Tobin’s Qt (adjusted by SIC2 industrial average)=Constant + Patentt−1 + R & D 
Intensityt−2 + 1st Generation Majorityt−1 + 2nd Generation Majorityt−1 + Patentt−1 × 1st 
Generation Majorityt−1 + Patentt−1 × 2nd Generation Majorityt−1 + R & D Intensityt−2 × 1st 
Generation Majorityt−1 + R & D Intensityt−2 × 2nd Generation Majorityt−1 + R & D Intensityt−1 + 
Patentt−2 + Family Management Percentaget−1 + Family Management adjusted by Firm Sizet−1 + 
Nonfamily Insider Ownershipt−1 + Institutional Ownershipt−1 + Firm Sizet−1 + Firm Aget−1 + 
Firm Riskt−1 + Prior Firm Performancet−1 + Current Ratiot−1 + Debt-to-Equity Ratiot−1 + 
Internationalizationt−1 + Retailt−1 + Servicet−1 + Manufacturingt−1 + Inverse Mill Ratio (first 
family generation) + Inverse Mill Ratio (second family generation) 
Models 1 and 3 are set as the baseline, while interactions are added in Models 2 and 4. In 
addition, we test for the mediation effect of patent in Model 4 by entering the individual term of 





Tables III and IV shows the regression results. H1 argued that the founding generation’s majority 
in family ownership positively moderates the value creation link between innovation input and 
innovation output as the positive link becomes stronger in family firms with the founding 
generation’s majority compared to non-family firms. H2 suggested that the family firms with 
second or later generation’s majority negatively moderates the value creation link as the positive 
link becomes weaker in the family firms with second or later generation’s majority compared to 
non-family firms. In the first model of value creation (Model 1, Table III), the estimated 
coefficient of R & D intensity is negative and insignificant (B=−21.41; p > 0.10), suggesting that, 
in general, investment in innovation input does not significantly contribute to value creation in 
innovation output by itself. We enter interactions in Model 2,Table III. H1 is not supported as the 
interaction between first generation family ownership and R & D intensity is insignificant 
(B=83.69; p > 0.10). However, H2 is supported as the interaction between the second and later 









Table IV Fixed effects longitudinal regression analysis of value appropriation 
 
We test value appropriation in family business vie Models 3 and 4 in Table IV. H3 argued that 
the founding generation’s majority in family ownership positively moderates the value 
appropriation link between innovation output and firm performance as the positive link becomes 
stronger in family firms with founding generation’s majority compared to non-family 
firms. H4 suggested that second or later generation’s majority negatively moderates the value 
appropriation link as the positive link becomes weaker in family firms with the second or later 
generation’s majority compared to non-family firms. 
 
In the first model of value appropriation (Model 3, Table IV), the estimated coefficient of patents 
in t−1 term is positive and marginally significant (B=0.001; p < 0.10), meaning that, in general, 
innovation output positively contributes to firm performance. In addition, the estimated 
coefficient of R & D intensity in t−2 team is positive and marginally significant (B=2.26; p < 
0.10). Combined, it seems like that R & D intensity has a positive effect on firm performance not 
fully mediated by patent. H3 is supported as the interaction between first generation family 
ownership and patents is positive and significant (B=0.004; p < 0.05). H4 is not supported as the 
interaction between the second and later generation family ownership and patents is negative but 
insignificant (B=0.0001; p > 0.10). In addition, the interaction between the second and later 
generation family ownership and R & D intensity in t−2 term is negative and marginally 
significant (B=−0.57; p < 0.05). This would suggest that regarding the effect on firm 
performance, second or later generation family owners may have weaker externalities of R & D 
intensity not captured by patent in comparison to nonfamily owners. Combined with what we 
have found in Table III, it seems like that second generation family owners are inferior in value 





To ensure our results are not artificial, we run two additional tests to ensure the robustness of our 
results. First, we replace our DV in Models 3 and 4 into Return on Equity. Again this variable is 
adjusted by SIC2 industrial average. The regression results remain the same as H2 and H3 are 
supported while H1 and H4 are not. Second, for all models, we set the time lag between 
dependent variable and others into two years. This reflects the fact that both value creation and 
value appropriation take time. Indeed, the process to transfer R & D investment into patent and 
the process to transfer patent into firm performance may take more than one-year. Again 
regression results are consistent with our primary findings. We conclude our results are robust. 
 
5. Discussion  
 
We extend the family business studies on innovation by distinguishing between two important 
stages, namely, the value creation and value appropriation in publicly traded family firms. First, 
we operationalize the registration number of patents of public-traded firms as the innovation 
output and explore the value creation process where R & D intensity (innovation input) is 
transformed into registered patents (innovation output). Then, we explore the value appropriation 
process by investigating the link between number of patents (innovation output) and 
Tobin’s Q (firm performance) (Lawson et al., 2012). Furthermore, we differentiate between 
family ownership with the founding generation’s majority and family ownership with the second 
or later generation’s majority and examine their distinctive capabilities on value-creation and 
value-appropriation processes in innovation in publicly traded family firms. 
 
Longitudinal regression analyses based on 285 yearly cross-firm S & P 500 observations yields 
several insights. First, we found that family ownership with second or later generation’s majority 
exhibits lower levels of value creation capabilities compared to non-family firms, whereas there 
is no difference between those of the firms with family ownership with a first generation’s 
majority and non-family firms. This is in contrast with the simplistic view suggesting that family 
firms start resembling non-family firms in later generations. According to our findings, the 
diminishing family influence in later generation family firms make them behave differently than 
both the first generation family firms and non-family firms. Hence, diminishing family influence 
in second or later generations does not automatically make them resemble non-family firms. 
Instead, both the first generation and the second or later generation publicly traded family firms 
may have similarities and differences from non-family publicly traded firms in their strategic 
decisions and implementation based on the level of SEW concerns and the nature of family 
influence. Second, we also found that family owned firms with a first generation’s majority have 
higher value appropriation abilities compared to non-family firms, while there is no significant 
difference in value appropriation between the later generation family firms and non-family firms. 
 
It should be noted that H1 suggests that founding generation family businesses are more capable 
of creating values in innovation compared to non-family firms. This hypothesis is not supported 
by our regression results as the founding generation and non-family firms have no significant 
difference in value creation. It appears that when the founding generation family firms and non-
family firms invest into R & D, family influence and SEW concerns do not play a substantial 
role in creating value. 
 
It is equally important to acknowledge that H4 is not supported as we did not find any significant 
difference between second or later generation family firms and non-family firms in value 
appropriation. This may be because of later generation family firms’ short-term orientation 
similar to that in non-family firms owing to less SEW concerns and family influence over the 
business, whereas founding generation family firms, with long-term orientation and intentions to 
pass a successful business onto future generations, may place more value on turning innovation 
output into profits. 
 
Our paper contributes to the family business, innovation, and KBV literature in several ways. 
First, previous family business studies drawing upon RBV and KBV often focus on the value 
creation based on bundles of valuable, rare, non-imitable, and non-substitutable resources or 
capabilities in family governance. While we generally agree with the direction of this prominent 
stream of research, we also suggest that the characteristics of knowledge in family governance 
may grant family firms certain advantages or disadvantages in value appropriation. Value 
appropriation is important as it reflects a firm’s capabilities in restricting competitors’ imitations 
hence help extract profits based on competitive resources. Nevertheless, to date, there is no other 
family business study investigating the innovation process comprehensively involving both value 
creation and appropriation stages. Overlooking the value appropriation phase may suggest that 
established family businesses’ competitive advantages are only temporary and non-sustainable in 
the long term. 
 
Second, our model extends the strategy literature on family firms by suggesting that the 
performance differences between family and non-family firms and the variance within the family 
business population are not only rooted in family firms’ propensity to establish certain strategies 
(e.g. Chrisman and Patel, 2012), but also stem from the family firm’s capabilities in 
implementing strategies and turning strategies into firm performance. Indeed, overlooking the 
latter may imply that once a strategy is established, its consequences are the same in both family 
and non-family firms. We suggest a two-stage system regarding how an innovation strategy (R & 
D investment) may lead to certain innovation output, which further contributes to the 
accumulation of firm performance. Indeed, we believe that the consequences of this strategy in 
family business (i.e. the link between strategy formulation and firm performance), is an under 
researched yet promising area that demands more research attention in future. 
 
Third, we intentionally build our theory by drawing upon SEW. SEW is often conceptualized as 
family centered goals that may have direct impact upon family firm strategies (Gómez-Mejía et 
al., 2007; Berrone et al., 2012). Nevertheless, we argue that the SEW can also be an underlying 
factor in value creation as well as the value retention and prevention from spillover or imitation 
from competitors. This perspective enriches our understanding of the SEW perspective in family 
business, as our framework suggests that SEW is not only a goal but also a source of resources 
and capabilities that are non-imitable and non-substitutable. 
 
Fourth, our findings suggest that generational differences in family owned firms not only 
influence value creation, but also value appropriation. Previous studies on generational 
differences often highlight the fact that founding- and second or later-generations vary according 
to their SEW concerns, hence founding and later generations differ in their formulation of 
strategies as certain strategies may potentially mitigate or enhance the SEW of the owning 
family. Our study extends this line of research by arguing that generations also differ regarding 
their characteristics of knowledge embedded in the family governance, which may facilitate or 
hinder the realization of financial wealth. In particular, our results show that the family owned 
firms with first generation’s majority are more successful than the family owned firms with 
second or later generation’s majority in both value creation and value appropriation. This is in 
line with research suggesting that some dynastic wealthy families develop more interest in 
maintaining the status quo through preserving old capital rather than being innovative and 
actively participating in the political arena to influence public policies, which consequently 
prevent capital mobility and retard economic growth in a broader sense (Morck et al., 
1998;Morck and Yeung, 2003; Morck and Steier, 2005). After an optimum level of wealth has 
been achieved over generations, family business members belonging to the second or later 
generation may prefer to pursue the private benefits of control, rather than economic goals, such 
as profitability on innovations. Therefore, publicly traded family firms are not only different 
from non-family publicly traded family firms, but also other publicly traded family firms. 
 
Fifth, our findings also suggest that although, in general, family firms may have disadvantages in 
creating value in innovation, at least some family owned firms, especially those with first 
generation’s majority, have advantages in appropriating profits from innovation activities. 
Similarly, our results imply that inferior performance in second or later generation family firms 




Although this paper may contribute to the family business literature in several ways, it is also 
important to state its limitations. First, this study is limited by its sample in analysis. We used a 
sample of firms listed in the S & P 500 from 2002 to 2006, suggesting that our US data may 
restrict the generalizability of our findings in a global context. It has been noted that the spillover 
of knowledge and mobility of employees are both determined by contextual conditions 
(Campbell et al., 2012), meaning that relationship we found may be contingent upon the external 
environment. Hence, future research needs to examine our model across countries. 
 
Second, we operationalize the family firm variable using two types of family ownership. 
However, it is likely that the owning family’s impact also stems from a day-to-day involvement 
in business besides the influence in the dominant coalition. Although we intend to control for the 
number of family members in management and the board, more insights may be gained by 
exploring the format and pattern that family managers actually follow to make decisions in value 
creation and value appropriation. 
 
Third, we conceptualize capabilities as the efficiencies of transforming innovation input into 
innovation output and transforming innovation output into firm performance. Accordingly, we 
explore the moderating roles of founding- and later- generation family businesses in value 
creation and value appropriation. It should be mentioned that innovation can be measured in 
alternative approaches, such as an innovation index (Hoffman et al., 1998), although these 
measures are often found positively correlated to innovation input and output (Romijn and 
Albaladejo, 2002). It would be helpful if future studies may apply different conceptualizations 
and accordingly, different measures of innovation to test the validity of our study. 
 
The limitations of this paper can also lead to a number of future research directions. First, as 
stated above, the regulatory context can affect the observed relationships and generalizability to 
the corporations around the world since the sample included S & P 500 firms headquartered in 
the USA. Even though increased globalization tends to cause similarities in business conduct in 
world economies, different legal regimes (e.g. common vs civil law) in different countries can 
result in differences in value creation and value appropriation. For example, the legal system in 
the USA has placed a longstanding importance on intellectual property protection, whereas the 
legal system in other countries may not provide the regulations and protection available in the 
USA. This may further limit value creation and appropriation in those countries for both family 
and non-family firms. Hence, since the legal context may be influential on the findings of this 
paper, future studies can test or extend the model in other countries with different legal systems. 
 
Similarly, despite the panel data analyses examining multiple years, the findings may vary in 
other time periods owing to the changes in the legal system regarding intellectual property 
protection and economic conditions which may affect the filing of patents due to cost. Therefore, 
future research can investigate different time periods than in our study. 
 
5.2. Other implications for future research 
 
Aside from the future research directions suggested in the discussion of findings and limitations, 
there may be other factors that may affect the value creation and value appropriation in publicly 
traded family firms. The imminence of succession (Chua et al., 2003) and succession planning 
are some of them. Furthermore, the effects of generational differences on value creation and 
appropriation might vary in family firms depending upon diversification (Anderson and Reeb, 
2003b; Jones et al., 2008), entrepreneurial orientation (Dess and Lumpkin, 2005; Lumpkin and 
Dess, 1996, 2001), corporate entrepreneurship (Dess et al., 1999; Lumpkin et al., 2005), and life-
cycle phases. All these contingencies suggest additional applications of RBV and KBV to the 
study of family businesses. 
 
Furthermore, value creation and value appropriation might vary in family firms depending upon 
the TMT characteristics (i.e. heterogeneous vs homogeneous), board composition (i.e. proportion 
of insiders, outsiders, and related outsiders) (Anderson and Reeb, 2004), board independence 
(Klein et al., 2005), CEO duality (Zahra, 2003), leadership styles of family managers and 
directors (Bass, 1990), social capital (Sirmon and Hitt, 2003), strategic networks (Arregle et al., 
2007), image concerns (Memili et al., 2010a, b), and life-cycle phases. All these factors suggest 
additional applications of RBV and KBV to the study of family businesses. 
 
5.3. Implications for practice 
 
The transgenerational success of publicly traded family firms depends on transgenerational value 
creation as well as value appropriation. First generation family firms that are successful in both 
value creation and value appropriation through effective knowledge management also hold the 
dual duty of fostering a learning culture to reduce the knowledge gap between generations and 
helping future successors develop absorptive and retentive capacities to facilitate knowledge 
transfer from one generation to the other. Both structured and less structured knowledge transfer 
processes may be necessary to facilitate exchanges, interactions, and ease of communication 
within the context of publicly traded family firms. Furthermore, intra-firm causal ambiguity of 
knowledge can be lowered through first generation family business leaders’ articulating to 
younger generation. Accordingly, intra-family succession plans need to involve knowledge 
transfer and management guidance as well. These can be facilitated by Human Resource 
Management activities in the forms of formal training programs with the participation of the 
active (and retired) senior generation management and the formal assignment of senior 
generation mentors (as well as informal mentoring) to the managers from later generation. 
Thereby, the senior generation managers can guide the younger generation managers and 
transmit critical information concerning innovation during and after their term of active duty. 
 
If publicly traded family firms can elevate the positive effects of generational differences and 
mitigate the negative effects, they can achieve long-term competitive advantages and superior 
performance. Publicly traded family firms concerned with maximizing shareholder value through 
both value creation and appropriation in innovation will be sought after by investors and reap the 
benefits of positive corporate publicity. 
 
6. Conclusion  
 
In conclusion, this paper provides the RBV and the KBV perspectives to generational differences 
and innovation in publicly traded family firms. The differences between family and non-family 
firms as well as among family firms themselves presented in this paper can help scholars, family 
business members, and investors better understand family involvement, and how it impacts firm 
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